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Parliamentary law is for German public law a bit what discus throwing is for Olympic
sports: archetype of athletic virtue, a deeply venerable thing of great tradition which
everybody knows and nobody ever watches, let alone practices, who doesn’t have to for
professional reasons. Next to the institutional and procedural rules of the Bundestag,
even electoral law, which at least seems to have some attractiveness for a certain kind of
math nerds, looks like a spectator sport. This lack of public esteem is, of course, very
regrettable and a big mistake, and thus it is fortunate that both electoral and
parliamentary law met in the most fascinating way this week in the German Bundestag.
A trilemma
A reform of the current electoral law is an extremely urgent matter in German federal
legislation due to the fact that, as a result of certain bizarre features of the electoral
system, the number of MPs might very well get completely out of hand after the next
general elections in September 2021. The causes and possible solutions with their
respective advantages and disadvantages have been discussed ad nauseam in recent
years and months, so I will only give a brief outline here: In principle, it is undisputed
that the Bundestag a) should be composed proportionally to the share of votes of the
parties, b) should allow for regional representation by means of directly elected MPs
within reasonably sized constituencies, and c) should not grow into completely
grotesque dimensions. For the most part of German post-war history, this wasn’t a
problem, but now, in a situation where the largest parties get only 30+ percent but
nevertheless keep sweeping up all the direct mandates as if they were still as dominant
as they used to be, these three goals no longer add up: one of them must go. Whichever
it is, it’s bound to considered an outrage, highly undemocratic, an attack on the
foundations of peaceful coexistence, constitutionally dubious and politically treacherous
by one part or another, so it’s not entirely surprising that the legislators’ efforts to tackle
that issue have, so far, amounted to exactly nothing.
Strictly speaking, that is not quite true. There is a draft law in Parliament which would
fix the problem. Three of the four opposition factions have joined forces for this
purpose, neither of which has to worry about winning a lot of constituencies directly
and therefore, unsurprisingly, propose to resolve the trilemma at the expense of the
number of direct mandates: instead of 299 constituencies, there would in future only be
250, and the ratio of list and direct mandates would shift from 50:50 to 60:40. This is
the idea of the FDP, the Greens and the Left Party, and there has already been a hearing
on it in the Committee on Internal Affairs in May.
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It is not hard to see why this is such a tough nut to crack for the largest faction, Angela
Merkel’s CDU/CSU: 231 out of its 246 MPs are directly elected and feel little inclination
to possibly make themselves redundant. This is particularly true of the CSU, whose 46
Bavarian MPs all owe their mandate to their relative majority in their constituencies.
Good thing, one might naively think, that they possess, together with their coalition




An der Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, Lehrstuhl für Öffentliches Recht
und Informationsrecht, insbesondere Datenschutzrecht (Prof. Dr. Matthias Bäcker,
LL.M.) ist die Stelle einer/s wissenschaftlichen Mitarbeiterin/s (100%)  zu
besetzen. Es besteht Gelegenheit zur Promotion oder ggfs. Habilitation. Nähere
Informationen finden Sie hier.
They haven’t, though. Instead, the coalition
is following a different tactic: The
opposition bill is neither approved nor
rejected. The majority in the interior affairs
committee, in its last meeting before the
summer break, found that there was still a
need for more discussion and adjourned
the topic. Without a recommendation for a
decision by the committee, the plenary
cannot vote on a bill, which is why the vote
was unceremoniously taken off the agenda.
This spared the coalition parties the embarrassment of having to take a position about
what they are for and what they are against while they haven’t even made up their
minds yet about what they want at all.
Roll call vote
Formally, there is not much to say against this, at least if you follow the opinion of the
Federal Constitutional Court: Two years ago, the Greens had tabled a draft to introduce
the marriage for all, which also went nowhere because the committee kept adjourning
the draft into oblivion. The Greens sued in Karlsruhe, but to no avail: The FCC showed
no enthusiasm for getting drawn into these parliamentary squabbles and found that
what happens or does not happen in a Parliamentary committee was at any rate merely
a “preparatory action” within the legislative procedure. While it’s true that the
Bundestag’s standing orders expressly state that the committees are obliged to
“complete the tasks assigned to them within due time” (§ 62), this is merely “internal
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parliamentary law” violations of which cannot be challenged in court. Instead, the FCC
referred the opposition, among other things, to their right to demand a report from the
committee after ten weeks of inactivity.
This is what they did, and the resulting report mirrors exactly what happened: nothing.
But parliamentary law gives the opposition all kinds of possibilities, too, and I
understand it was the FDP Group which came up with a creative idea: to have a debate
on this report put on the agenda, plus a vote on proceeding in plenary with the
deliberation of the draft without a committee decision, which requires a two-thirds
majority. The trick: they asked to make that a roll-call vote, which can be denied only on
very narrow grounds. This, the opposition hopes, would force the coalition MPs to
declare, if not what they want, then at least on what they do not  want. That is not
nothing, on the contrary. That is exactly what the opposition is there for: to make the
government take responsibility for what they do or don’t, and as opposed to what.
Now, the CDU/CSU Group has only this week been able to agree internally on a
proposal which – lo and behold – doesn’t not look all that different from the
opposition’s draft: a reduction in the number of constituencies, if only by 19 instead of
49. The proposal includes in addition to keep seven surplus mandates
(Überhangmandate) uncompensated for, but it is not unlikely that they will concede
this point to their coalition partner SPD for a coalition compromise in return for
dropping their demand to cap the number of mandates at 690 and, if necessary, to cut
back surplus mandates. If the coalition parties agree on something like this over the
summer, they will have a lot of explaining to do to their local party members, as many
district chapters have already picked their direct candidates and may have to repeat this
procedure in that case. But that will still be easier than selling the voters a Bundestag
with possibly 800+ members, along with the admission of having voted against a model
that would have avoided this outcome without having presented one of their own.
To some extent, the coalition parties have to be credited with not having torpedoed the
roll-call vote. Rejecting this would hardly have been legally justifiable. But that does not
excuse the fact that it is gradually becoming an established practice what the FCC in one
of its earliest decisions already 68 years ago clearly marked as a danger to
parliamentarianism:
In the event of disloyal or improper treatment, a motion may be “buried” in committee,
and the deliberation and decision-making by the plenum may be practically prevented.
It is precisely in such seemingly unspectacular and technical matters that we see how
solid the foundations on which parliamentary democracy rests actually still are. In so
many democracies around the world, these foundations have been exposed as utterly
eroded – especially in the USA, where both sides of the aisle have for decades shown
ever less self-restraint in using every procedural trick in the book to make the other’s life
as miserable as possible. The refusal of the Republican majority leader in the US Senate
to even allow Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland a hearing was the low
point of this development.
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This week on Verfassungsblog
… summarized by LENNART KOKOTT:
In recent weeks, the Supreme Court of the United States issued one remarkable
decision after the other. With presidential election drawing closer, the decisions and
their implications for the election are in the spotlight. A narrow decision allowing the
President to dismiss senior officials for political reasons alone could prove to be a fatal
blow against democratic checks and balances, writes DAVID M. DRIESEN. In Corona
Constitutional #39, MAXIMILIAN STEINBEIS talks to STEPHEN F. ROSS about the
recent abortion-related June Medical decision of the court and about the particular
constellation that has led Chief Justice Roberts to join the majority opinion. SARAH
KATHARINA STEIN warns that one should not be misled by the decision which,
although at first glance seemingly securing reproductive rights, could nevertheless lead
to a slow erosion of the extensive protection of those rights. Finally, LEAH LITMAN
looks ahead to an upcoming decision in which the court will rule on whether states can
oblige their electors, i.e. the members of the electoral college that actually elects the
president, to abide by the election results in the general ballot. The court will probably
allow this – with consequences for the upcoming presidential election.
Meanwhile in Russia, far-reaching changes to the constitution were rubber-
stamped in a referendum. JOHANNES SOCHER presents the constitutional
amendment process and its essential contents and notes serious legitimacy deficits,
which make the changes appear as a prime example of abusive constitutionalism with
the aim of securing power for the current president. The constitutional reform is meant
to demoralize political opponents of the president whose position in the constitutional
framework is again clearly strengthened, writes CAROLINE VON GALL. In addition,
central elements of Putin’s anti-liberal constitutional practice have been
constitutionalized, she says. YULIA IOFFE and HEDI VITERBO  point to elements of
homophobia in the constitutional reform which, under the guise of protecting children’s
rights, has enshrined heteronormative family models in a way that served to mobilise
the electorate for the referendum. 
With regard to the current debate in Germany on the deletion of the concept of Rasse
(race) from the Grundgesetz, PIERRE DE VOS writes that from a South African
perspective such a move would be perplexing. With regard to the South African
Constitution, such a proposal would be perceived as a retrograde defence of white
privilege, he says.
The precarious and inhumane situation of refugees on the Greek islands has
moved out of the focus of reporting in recent weeks. However, the situation has not
improved. On the contrary, there has been an increase in illegal pushbacks during the
pandemic and there hardly is any access to justice for refugees, NIKI GEORGIOU and
ROBERT NESTLER of the NGO Equal Rights Beyond Borders report in an interview
with MAXIMILIAN STEINBEIS in Corona Constitutional #41.
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The Covid-19 pandemic continues to generate constitutional law problems. KRISTIN
BERGTORA SANDVIK and JULIA KOEHLER-OLSEN analyse the disproportionate
burdens that children had to bear in the pandemic and present alternatives for crisis
management in conformity with childrens’ rights against the backdrop of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its implementation in Norwegian
constitutional law. MIKA KNÖR looks at the entry ban for foreign nationals to Japan,
which has been in force since April, and places it into the context of constitutional
immigration discourse of Japan and the extremely conservative jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court on immigration matters which might eventually shift if the entry ban
will be challenged in court.
The pandemic has made it very clear that there is no unity in the United Kingdom,
writes CATRIONA MULLAY, and looks at the centrifugal dynamics of the fight against
the coronavirus, which the British government has done nothing to oppose.
Speaking of the UK, SERHII LASHYN says that now that Brexit is done, the British
Advocate General at the European Court of Justice must leave the court. This is the
uncomfortable but necessary consequence of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal and also
necessary in order not to put the independence of judges in a worse position than that
of the Advocates General, he says.
Two decisions by German courts dealing with discrimination on the basis of
gender identity have attracted attention this week. The Federal Constitutional Court
has declared inadmissible a constitutional complaint of a woman who fought against
being addressed as Kunde (a male customer) in her bank’s printed forms. However, the
court’s more recent case law indicates that the court does not in principle rule out the
recognition of a claim to gender-adequate language and could decide in this sense in
cases to come, writes ISABEL LISCHEWSKI. LEONIE STEINL presents a decision of
the Higher Regional Court of Cologne which found that hate speech against women can
be a criminal act of incitement to hatred (Volksverhetzung). To take seriously gender-
related dimensions of hate speech, particularly on the internet, has been long overdue
and is an important signal in the criminal law debate regarding the topic, she says.
The Federal Home Office has severely attacked the author of a satirical column
critical of the police in the daily newspaper TAZ and even threatened to file charges
against her. This is not the first conspicuous case of disregard for free speech from the
Ministry of the Interior, also known as the ministry in charge of protecting the
constitution (Verfassungsministerium). In Corona Constitutional #40, MAXIMILIAN
STEINBEIS spoke with the anthropologist WERNER SCHIFFAUER about the culture
and internal workings of the ministry and discussed the understanding of state and
society wich is cultivated there.
The regulatory response to local Covid-19 outbreaks in Germany keeps raising
questions. ANDREA KIEßLING looks at the provisions of administrative law that are the
basis for ordering mass quarantine in worker’s shelters or entire apartment blocks and
explains why the current practice of the German authorities is partly unconstitutional.
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In view of the sharp rise of infections in the meat industry, demands have been made
for companies to pay parts of the bill for containment measures. THORSTEN KOCH
examines what legal means are available for this purpose and reaches the conclusion
that the classic instruments of hazard prevention law are not tailored to the situation of
a pandemic; rather, the legislator is now called upon to take action, he says.
FRANCISKA ENGESER writes that the question of fair financial burden sharing also
arises with regard to the coverage of test costs by the health insurance companies, as
there is a danger that private health insurance companies will not be charged
adequately.
MAXIMILIAN KOLTER finally deals from a legal theory point of view with the German
draft of a new law on sanctions for law-breaking corporations, which calls itself
corporate criminal law, he says, but gives away the expressive potential of such a
law and does not even appear as a substantial threat to those addressed by the norm
from the outside. 
So much for this week. Please don’t forget to support us on Steady or refrain from
cancelling your support if it’s up for renewal (please!), stay safe and be well! All best,
Max Steinbeis
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While you are here…
If you enjoyed reading this post – would you consider supporting our work? Just click
here. Thanks!
All the best, Max Steinbeis
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